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This research studies from a firm level experiment in which we explored an exogenous 
technological change in firm's productivity. We present evidence from the manufacturing 
industry in the United States of America from 2000 to 2010, when the artificial intelligence are 
widely introduced across manufacturing sector. The result suggests that positive technological 
shocks affect the productivity in a positive way. Analysis of the data shows that the sector effect 
and the geographical effect exist but both are limited. These results highlight the universal impact 
of technological shocks and the interplay among innovations, firms and employees.  
 
 





1 Introduction  
With the boom in technology nowadays, we are heading into a new era with humans’ labors can 
be replaced by the artificial intelligence. Statistics show that one out of twenty-five workers in 
Japan is robot (Lin et al, 2012). Shareholders nowadays begin to decide to hire a person or a 
machine in the next few years. There are more and more cases and studies on this kind of 
substitution.  
The real business cycle (RBC) paradigm are proposed by Kydland and Prescott (1982) with the 
introduction of the technological shocks, the short-run fluctuations to capture the exogenous 
changes in the real economic environment, supported with the data from the postwar US 
economy. Kydland and Prescott suggested that only technology shocks, random fluctuations in 
the productivity level, could shift the constant growth trend up or down. Moreover, the RBC 
theory points out the positive correlation between technology shock and labor employment. But 
some scholars were skeptical on the observations on the RBC theory with the absence of the 
independent evidence to track technological shocks. Prescott only posts the data of oil shocks but 
not the whole industry, which means that this model strategy has little empirical foundation. The 
most powerful argument (Gali, 1996), combined the data from the G7 countries, stresses the 
apparent contract to the patterns of RBC model. The data reflect a downward shift in the labor 
employment schedule caused by technology shocks for a majority of countries. However, similar 
to the studies of Gali, Christiano (2003) suggested a specification error in the way that Gali 
presented. And after the correction, the relationship between the technology and per capita hours 
worked is actually positive.  
In sum, these researches are all presented technological shocks in the macroeconomics level and 
there are little study concerning the microeconomics empirical research. The major reason for 
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this lack is that it is hard to define technology and collected the relevant data due to the 
technological revolution is transforming time to time. This research tries to solve this problem 
and seek another way to track the development of technology.  
From the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, an official data website, there is boom in 
productivity output in manufacturing industry during the period of 2000 to 2010. On the other 
hand, from this website, there is also an obvious sign of manufacturing job loss. From the 
previous studies, it is mainly accounted for the new artificial intelligence that robots replace 
human labors. This research therefore aims to identify the huge restructure during this period and 
estimate how much the technology has changed on productivity. Does the technology make our 
society better-off or worse-off? How will the corporations be affected with rapid digital 
technologies revolution? What is the effect on the work labors who are replaced by the robots?  
These are the concerns that this research tries to identify. The main research question is to seek 
the effect of this kind of technological shocks.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the industry background. Section 3 
describes the data and some relating issues. Section 4 develops a theoretical framework to find 
how our experiment is designed to identify such effects and to analyze the effects of 
technological shocks. Section 5 presents evidence on the effect of technological shocks across 
sectors and some interesting findings in association with the analysis. Section 6 concludes.  
2 Literature Review and Industry Background 
The paper is also related to a small but growing literature on the artificial intelligence used in 
firms where human beings are easier to be replaced by these kind of new technology. At first, this 
new kind of technology is first found on the science fiction or on research prediction (Rifkin, 
1996). But now, it is invented and applied in our society ranging from manufacturing factories to 
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households. The replacement will even expand because the contemporary computer science can 
actually understand and mimic human beings (Vardi, 2015). Lin et al (2012) raised the issues 
concerning on the impact of robotics on a growing chorus on international level, which means 
that custom-designed computer vision systems are being applied to specific manufacturing tasks 
for a broad range of industrial applications. Moreover, Stuart Elliot (2016) found that the robots 
could replace 80% of the current work and may eliminate tens of millions of jobs in the 
manufacturing, agricultural and service industries in the future. This prediction hides the fact that 
huge chaos may happen in our economics nowadays. There are more and more studies 
concerning the artificial intelligence.  
Manufacturing industry in the United States of America is the largest industry in the world during 
the year of 2000 to 2010 (Levinson, 2013). The introduction of artificial intelligence is 
transforming the whole industry during this period. The production and shipment of goods in 
manufacturing industry in the United States is a large and important part of the economy in 
general.  
Usually, manufacturing jobs loss was at an average rate of 0.5 percent per year from 1980 to 
1999. But this rate suddenly rose to 3.1 percent per year from 2000 to 2011, almost six times 
faster than the prior two decades (Atkinson et al, 2012). According to Hicks et al (2015), 13 
percent of manufacturing job losses are accounted to trade and the rest are because of robots and 
other factors. Decker et al. (2013) found that the decline exists within detailed industry, firm size 
and firm age categories. Specifically, the rates of job destruction are greater than the rate of job 
creation over the past 30 years with notable further declines in the Great Recession.  
In this brief, we identify and explain this gap by the introduction of artificial intelligence.  In 
order to evaluate the technological effects on firms and employment, we focus on a period from 
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2000 to 2010, which contains the largest impact of artificial intelligence in manufacturing 
industry in U.S. history. This situation is what we tried to explore in this paper.  
However, the job lost is not proportional applied to all the sectors from the data of U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Actually, the low-value-added sectors (textiles, furniture, and wood sectors) 
are most vulnerable while the food, petroleum, beverages and chemicals sectors have less effect.  
Industry 2000 2010 Changes 
Oil and gas extraction 144879 289670 99.94% 
Mining, except oil and gas 54258 114750 111.49% 
Wood products 93161 70261 -24.58% 
Nonmetallic mineral products 95841 90787 -5.27% 
Primary metals 154726 234132 51.32% 
Fabricated metal products 266786 295006 10.58% 
Machinery 291805 316064 8.31% 
Computer and electronic products 527883 368702 -30.15% 
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 122572 108328 -11.62% 
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts 482142 422670 -12.33% 
Other transportation equipment 162215 248092 52.94% 
Furniture and related products 74899 57571 -23.14% 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 116363 154316 32.62% 
Food and beverage and tobacco products 552124 804260 45.67% 
Textile mills and textile product mills 85284 49872 -41.52% 
Apparel and leather and allied products 67809 18603 -72.57% 
Paper products 163590 168730 3.14% 
Petroleum and coal products 230706 601691 160.80% 
Chemical products 452737 714857 57.90% 
Plastics and rubber products 177026 185079 4.55% 
Table 1: Output Classified by Industry (Millions of Dollars) 
Manufacturing jobs are lost a greater percentage since 2000 than it did, especially during the 
Great Depression (Aktinson, 2012). However, although the recession has the most severe impact 
in the manufacturing industry, the recovery rate is the fastest after the recession. It nearly 
regained those jobs in the subsequent 30 months. (Atkinson et al, 2012) The firm startup rate is 
high even in the recession. (Decker et al, 2013)  
In sum, labor and productivity output are the major change during the research period. But 
national manufacturing production, after the adjustment of inflation rate, remains on a steady and 
long-term growth path (Hicks et al, 2015). Despite the continued growth and long-term health of 
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manufacturing, significant revolution remains within the industry. So the selecting industry and 
research period we choose are both representative, and cover technological shocks.  
3 Data and Descriptive Evidence 
3.1 The Sample 
In this paper, the data our research presented are in the firm level, explicitly collected one by one 
to shed light on the issues concerning new technology in manufacturing industry in the United 
States of America. The data are concentrated on the manufacturing industry from 2000 to 2010 in 
the United States of America because the huge transformation of artificial intelligence was 
introduced during this period. This research tries to collect the data on the annual report of the all 
corporations in manufacturing industry from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. All 
the data used in this paper are annual rather than quarter because the technological shocks are 
usually in lower frequency, which implies that the annual data may fits better in the model. Since 
all the data are verified by both the auditing firms and government, they are reliable under 
Comparability Principle. The corporations' individual records contain the performance each 
corporation plays each year.  
Throughout, we analyze data on the main operating performance on the firm and focus on the 
American employees on the firms during the research period from January 1st, 2000 until 
December 31st, 2010. The fiscal year ended date is ranging from January 1st till December 31st 
and is decided by the company. The usual fiscal year ended date is June 30th or December 31st. 
To contain the whole firm individual data in our sample, we do not limit the exact day or month 
with the assumption that a few months (less than 12 months) will not have time difference 
compared to 10 years revolution. This means that we consider that one report collected from one 
company with the fiscal year ended with January 1st, 2000 is at the same time period with the 
 
 8 
report collected from another company with the fiscal year ended with December 31st, 2000. 
Besides, the corporations are usually international firms and contain employees all over the 
world. To compare the effects of employment in the United States of America, we only count the 
workers that were available for work in the land of United States of America in the data set. The 
final sample contains 12,057 firms across 19 manufacturing sectors and 53 areas (50 states, 
Washington D.C., Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico). As part of our experimental design, the 
technological change happens within the research period.  
There are a lot of ways to derived sectors. Here we follow the way of Hall (1965) to divide the 
manufacturing industry into 19 sectors - Food & kindred product, Textiles & apparel, Chemicals 
excl. drugs, Drugs & Medicine inst., Petroleum ref. & ext., Rubber & misc. plast., Stone, clay & 
glass, Primary metals, Fabricated metals, Engines, fan & const., Office, comp. eq., Other mach., 
not elec., Elec. equip. & supplies, Motor veh. & trans. Communication equip, Aircraft & 
aerospace, Prof. & sci. equip., Lumber, wood & paper, Misc. consumer goods and 
Conglomerates.  
For the geographical dispersion, although Washington D.C. is not a state in the United States of 
America, it is the capital of the country. So it is an important area due to the political reason and 
the business environment may contain some difference. In this paper we take it as a separate 
“State”. For the similar reasons, both Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico are the islands on the ocean. 
Since we cannot count them into any state, we also separate them. So, we have a total of 53 
locations across the United States of America.  
3.2 Data on Technological Shocks 
The main types of technology that can replace human labors are robots, automation, and software 
(Roman, 2013). To define this technology, we use the data from second class account title 
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subsidiary of “Machinery, Equipment and Software” under the account of “Property, Plant and 
Equipment” from the Consolidated Statement of Financial Position (Balance Sheet from Annual 
Report).  
The term “Property, Plant and Equipment” refers to non-current tangible assets which are used in 
the process to generate revenues (Horngren et al, 2013). Under this fixed asset account, account 
of “Machinery, Equipment and Software” are mainly long-lived intangible assets for the purpose 
of production with or without physical existence. Robots and automation in the factory are in the 
form of machinery, equipment or the software in the computer. So, the account of “Machinery, 
Equipment and Software” can exactly define the three main types of technology that this research 
focuses on.  
The scholars usually used the data of Research and Development cost (R&D cost) or patent data 
to capture technological shocks. R&D cost is spent with the intention to develop innovative 
goods or services as the type of operating expense (Horngren et al, 2013). However, to be clear, 
R&D cost is counted as expense in the Income Statement rather than the assets in the balance 
sheet by the accounting policy adopted all over the world. The policy makers generally agree that 
it is impossible to predict whether or not such a R&D project can be successful. The value under 
the R&D cost are the value that cannot guarantee the future benefits. More importantly, once the 
R&D project could provide some evidence to generate future benefits, it will be written under the 
account of “Patent” or “Machinery, Equipment and Software” on the balance sheet. Therefore, it 
is inaccurate to count the value under R&D cost as the development of technology.  
The account of “Patent” is also not accurate to count as technological changes. Patent has a 
problem in application for the simple reason that the patents do not have broad applicability 
which further can be assigned to no industry use. Particularly another trouble is the fact that even 
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the new patent is applicable, the process of application takes time, as its pattern of adoption, 
creating the possibility of one patent invested in one year and may have the effect of the 
technological shocks a few years later. Given that patent is typically verified at the time of 
invention, the assignment of Patent as technological shocks is presumably subject to error. 
Compared with patent, all the investment under the account of “Machinery, Equipment and 
Software” performed by a company is assigned to the industry in which the company can assure 
the application and is the actual amount of technology that one company adopted at that 
accounting year.   
Apart from the advantages, I must mention two problems with the data used in this paper under 
the “Machinery, Equipment and Software” account. Firstly, to assure the accuracy of the data, the 
data used in this paper are the companies who disclosure the information in the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission. In virtually all such cases, we suppress either the majority of small 
companies or some large companies that do not verify in the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Secondly, the “Machinery, Equipment and Software” data are collected from the 
company. There may exist distinction in the data between industry of innovative and industry of 
use. This implies one situation that the new investment is not the new technology. Ideally, I 
would like to interpret the change number from the “Machinery, Equipment and Software” 
account as "technological innovations". My sense is that we can at least safely assume that new 
investment in “Machinery, Equipment and Software” contain a higher fraction of manufacture 
innovations, at least the new investment is innovative compared with the old machinery, 
equipment and software in the individual corporation level.  
3.3 Data Collection  
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The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is an exchange agency supported by United 
States federal government, following the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. According to the law, 
all of the listed companies must disclosure their operations in the accounting time period in the 
form of Statements of Financial Position, Income Statement and Cash Flow Statements and so on. 
The website (https://www.sec.gov/) is an open platform for the public especially the investors to 
buy or sell their shares in the stock market based on the financial data.  
To have the specified sample in the SEC website, I collected the data in six steps: 1) Assorting of 
SIC Code by manufacturing industries, 2) Typing the SIC Code and the location in the Company 
Fillings, 3) Getting the CIK number and the company name, 4) Searching the data of one specified 
company by its CIK number, 5) Spotting that company’s annual report in 2000 and 2010, and 6) 
Copying the figures under the different accounts.  
3.3.1 Assorting of SIC Code by Manufacturing Industries 
The SIC Code means the Standard Industrial Classification Code, indicating which type of the 
companies engaged. In the SIC Code list, not only the manufacturing industries are available, but 
also the agricultural industries and services industries are shown. After finding all the codes in 
manufacturing industries, an assortment is needed to match the 19 sectors in our research.  
3.3.2 Typing the SIC Code and the Location in the Company Fillings 
The Company Fillings are the quick search agency on the SEC website to have the company data. 
In the fillings, you can find all the listed company’s name via the information you provide. Here I 
screen both the sectors and states.  
3.3.3 Getting the CIK number and the Company’s Name 
Additionally, after the screening process, the CIK number and the Company’s Name are shown. 
The CIK number means the Central Index Key (CIK) number. It is used on the website computer 
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systems to distinguish one corporation and used for the public to identify its own information in 
the SEC’s files. Therefore, I have a total of 12,057 companies and their CIK numbers.  
3.3.4 Searching the Data of One Specified Company by its CIK Number 
In succession of 12,057 CIK numbers, I come to “CIK Fast Search” on the website. Putting one 
CIK number in the search engine, it will show all the disclosure information including annual 
reports, quarter reports and registration statement under Securities Act of 1933. All documents are 
from this specific company in detail.  
3.3.5 Spotting that Company’s Annual Report in 2000 and 2010 
Usually, there are hundreds of documents in the result page. To have the company’s annual report 
in 2000 and 2010 quickly, another filter is used. Information on the annual report are classified in 
10-K in SEC website and it is possible to selected the effective date of one file. After filling the 
type and the date in the filter, the annual report is shown.  
3.3.6 Copying the Figures under the Different Accounts 
Because the research tries to find a way to address the effect of artificial intelligence in the firm 
level and to add the empirical studies, in order to address and evaluate this issue on our society in 
response to this kind of technology revolution, the data I collected concentrate on production and 
sales part under different accounts. To analyze the data, I type the amount of the accounts into 
another excel sheet one by one.  
Finishing the data collection in the fiscal year 2010, I turn to step 5 and change the filter information 
to have the data in the fiscal year 2000 and then follow step 6 to collect the data. Consequently, we 
have all the data we needed for one firm. Furthermore, I turn back to step 4 to put another CIK 
number in the “CIK Fast Search” to have another company’s document. After 12,057 times to type 
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different CIK numbers in step 4 and 24,114 times to change the filter information in step 5, I have 
the whole sample of the data.  
3.4 Summary of the Data 
From the sample dispersion table, huge transformation happened in manufacturing sectors, which 
fits what we observe in macroeconomics data. To have a more detail information on this 
dispersion, we count the Gone Rate in different sectors, which implies that the companies went 
bankruptcy or being mergers and acquisition during our research period. The Gone rate in the 
whole sample is 63.15%, the highest probability to be bankruptcy is focused on Lumber, Textiles 
and non-electricity machine sectors. They are all low-value-added industry, which follows the 
macroeconomics data we found in Section 2. 
Industry 2000 2010 Changes 
Food kindred prod. 3653736360 35627474.97 -99.02% 
Textiles apparel 13332409.57 24323845.22 82.44% 
Chemicals exci. drugs 7894303.835 37355921.48 373.20% 
Drugs med. inst. 66758190.52 191094648.4 186.25% 
Petroleum ref.  ext. 78153321.16 211873101.1 171.10% 
Rubber misc. plast. 24978950.78 38073252.06 52.42% 
Stone, clay glass 23053696.42 2330754.974 -89.89% 
Primary metals 4166468.612 17348255.74 316.38% 
Fabricated metals 20983254.98 20417286.1 -2.70% 
Engines,fan const. 18574549.72 965861.566 -94.80% 
Office, comp. eq. 116089113 219445787.1 89.03% 
Other mach., not elec. 5021560.406 7320408.738 45.78% 
Elec. equip.  supplies 31698357.28 60734829.81 91.60% 
Motor veh.  trans. Communication equip 164640089.6 127757952.2 -22.40% 
Aircraft aerospace 19789257.79 32510061.59 64.28% 
Prof.  sci. equip. 61737943.1 113414736.7 83.70% 
Lumber, wood paper 1439641811 34729561.35 -97.59% 
Misc. consumer goods 59233092.07 73396679.66 23.91% 
Conglomerates 6739865.945 10736750.13 59.30% 
Table 2: Company Output Classified by Industry (Thousands of Dollars) 
As shown in the Table 3, during the period of 2000 and 2010, 2,515 companies were not started 
to disclosure their information in U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in total. This parts 
account for 20.68% in our whole sample. Since we do not have the information of these 
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companies in 2000, we exclude the companies started later than 2000 to have a more time 
consistent data in company level. This reduced our sample to 9,542 observations.  
Industry 
Number of 
Company in 2000 
Number of Company 
Remained in 2010 
Gone Rate 
Food kindred prod. 357 57 70.59% 
Textiles apparel 396 27 79.55% 
Chemicals exci. drugs 714 175 60.36% 
Drugs med. inst. 1260 502 44.68% 
Petroleum ref.  ext. 1669 397 63.69% 
Rubber misc. plast. 353 66 64.87% 
Stone, clay glass 104 19 67.31% 
Primary metals 625 206 58.08% 
Fabricated metals 464 74 70.04% 
Engines,fan const. 114 24 68.42% 
Office, comp. eq. 1712 265 63.61% 
Other mach., not elec. 99 1 83.84% 
Elec. equip.  supplies 523 62 66.73% 
Motor veh.  trans. Communication 
equip 
688 143 65.26% 
Aircraft aerospace 132 24 60.61% 
Prof.  sci. equip. 1322 241 60.29% 
Lumber, wood paper 790 82 80.63% 
Misc. consumer goods 589 112 67.57% 
Conglomerates 146 38 59.59% 
Table 3: Gone Rate Classified by Industry 
Around 80.26% of the companies which disclosure their information in U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission on 2000 do not have the information in the year of 2010. It can 
potentially be ascribed to two reasons— bankruptcy or mergers and acquisitions. We called this 
ratio "Gone Rate". To begin to provide descriptive evidence on these mechanisms, we first note 
that the "Gone Rate" is different from the failure ratio. The Failure Rate are accounted for the 
firms that went bankruptcy but the Gone Rate also includes the mergers and acquisitions process. 
The bankruptcy is definitely a disaster for a company but through mergers and acquisitions, the 
shareholders of this company can even gain more profits than holding it. Moreover, the 
expansion of one firm can also achieved by mergers and acquisition. Although the Gone Rate 
may also contain the later condition which may benefit for the firms, we still consider that this 
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high rate shows the risks. As discussing in the Section 2, the Great Recession and technological 
shocks can also account for that. It also fits the macroeconomics data we have in Section 2.   
On the other hand, when we come to the Gone Rate after excluding the firms started later than 
2000, it shows that this specific business environment affects the whole manufacturing industry, 
no matter in low-valued-goods or high-valued-goods. Following the theory of business dynamism 
(Decker, 2013), the Great Recession has the general impact across the manufacturing industry. In 
this way, we take the major Gone Rate accounting to the specific business environment damaging 
to the manufacturing firms in the United States.  
However, the gone rate in the top 500 output companies is only 0.6% while the general gone rate 
is 63.15%. The increasing scale of the firms can actually increase the chance to survive heavily. 
This rose some interesting topic on whether the large cluster of corporation can resist depression.  
4 Empirical Methods 
Using data collected for the research, an ordinary least squares (OLS) can be designed, 
transforming from the Cobb-Douglas production function. Based on our research questions, we 
can develop a regression equation to address the relationship between production output and 
technology changes.  
Y = z𝐴𝛾𝐾𝛼𝐿𝛽                                                                 (1) 
lnY = lnz + γlnA + αlnK + βlnL + ε                                           (2) 
“Y” is the production output, the number of “Sales” Account minus that of “Intermediate Input” 
Account. “z” refers to the development level of science and technology, which is unknown. But 
we can calculate “z” in the regression as the constant number and have the conjecture figure. “A” 
represent the technological shocks, which explain carefully in section 3.2. “K” and “L” are 
obvious capital and the number of workers. “Ɛ” captures unexpected shocks that can be 
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originated in different sources. The error term is random and unobserved. Using the model above, 
we can have the correlation between dependent variable and explanatory variables.  
To have a more accurate assumption on the relationship between production output and 
technology changes, we add the variables sectors and location as the control variables (T).  
ln𝑌𝑖 = ln𝑧𝑖 + γln𝐴𝑖 + αln𝐾𝑖 + βln𝐿𝑖 + θ𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                   (3) 





























Number of Observations 3140 3140 3140 
F-test 342.39 669.33 239.71 
R2 0.7822 0.8030 0.8015 
Table 4: the Regression Table 
（Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.） 
The regression table is shown above. The first column is the general model, omitting the effect of 
location and sectors. The second column using the 19 sectors as control variable while the third 
column using the 53 locations as control variable.  
At the first column, the correlation between the independent variable (technology changes) and 
dependent variable (production output) should be examined. Here we can see that the correlation 
is strong and all independent variables are significant at 1% level.  
The coefficients of the technological shocks, capital and the number of workers are both positive, 
which means that the progress in technology, increase in capital and hire more workers will 
expand the production output. This result fits what we believed in the past century is that 
technology will boosts productivity. However, in this rule does not work anymore in the 
macroeconomics data nowadays. This is a new phenomenon that we cannot apply to the existing 
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economic theory. Why some we still have some empirical evidence which shows that the 
negative relationship of the technological shocks to the comovement between the productivity 
output and employment?  
It seems to blame artificial intelligence since this kind of technology can actually replace human 
labors. We are now more and more comfortable to work with such robots without necessarily 
supervision or encouragement to keeping humans motivated due to technology revolution. This 
kind of replacement seems to have the direct impact on the employment rate.  
We hypothesize that an important reason for the negative relationship in macroeconomics data is 
a misapplication of technology within firms. According to Wolff (2016), the capitalism system is 
to be blamed. The employers, or the 0.1% top rich people controls the major part of capitals. 
They are the ones to control the corporation and to make every effort to maximize the profits and 
reduce the cost. That is why these employers use artificial intelligence to replace humans - it is 
cheaper to "hire" intelligent robots than hire the real persons. However, they forget one important 
thing which is that if the majority of people (employees) do not earn the wages, no one will buy 
the products which companies produce.  
The dynamic effects of the accumulation of capital will generate these kind of financial crisis 
which seems to blame technological progress. With the introduction of artificial intelligence, the 
reduce cost on labor gives a potential movement to the relative reduce the demand at short and 
medium-term horizons. This implies that the goods that the firms produced cannot be sold and 
the firms will reduce the production in response to this situation. This can also explain why with 
the introduction of new technology the total output actually decreases. When neither new income 
nor a market is explored, it results the recession of this specific market.  
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This situation is what we need to change but not stop the development of artificial intelligence. In 
West’s study (2015), he predicts that the government needs to transform the whole business 
environment, on health care, pension, disability and income supplements outside of full-time 
employment, following the new technology.  
Back to our regression table, the general model can explain 78.22% of the variable. To capture 
the accurate determinant of the production output, we can revise our model by adding the control 
variables. The second and the third model explain the production better, 80.30% and 80.15% 
respectively. More interestingly, we find that without control of the coefficients of the three 
independent variables, the sum of the coefficients are around 1. The sum in the second model is 
0.9906 while the sum in the third model is 0.9897, which means that if we double the inputs and 
we can have the double output more or less. This result raises some interesting questions that 
need further research.  
In our experiment, we show in realistic how one company should react within competition in 
response to technological shocks, which can potentially explain the positive correlation between 
productivity and employment. The model predicts that technology shocks generate a positive 
movement between those two variables, labor employment and firm productivity. The intuition 
for the results is straightforward and satisfies our common sense. In equilibrium, the expansion of 
one corporation needs people. With the replacement of labors on production sector, the labors can 
adjust themselves and shift to non-production sector.  
5 Assumption on the Development Level of Science and Technology (z) 
There are already some studies that make this prediction. But the development level in one sector 
is hard to concreate. The previous studies usually recover it from the macroeconomics level. In this 
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research, we provided a new way to assume the development level, not from macroeconomics data 
but from a bunch of firm data.  
The development level of science and technology is obviously different across sectors. Following 
the production function, we can transfer the model and get the development level of science and 
technology in the table below.  
Industry 
Number of the 
Observation 
lnz 
lnz with Control 
Variable 




































































































Table 5: Assumption on lnz 
(Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.) 
The third column is calculated from the general model while the fourth column is from the model 
with the 53 states as control variable. Compared with the two columns, the location seems less 
important in determining the development level. So the technological development is across 
country.  
From the table, the development level in textiles sector are high, which fits what we know that 
during the research period, artificial intelligence is introduced in textiles industry and increases the 
productivity. On the high-value-added sector, the development level of science and technology is 
much lower because in these industries the new artificial intelligence were hard to replace human 
labors. These firms still need to keep investing and hiring the effective labors to produce more.  
Despite the differences across sectors, we view the advantages on employers’ side easily. If the 
development of technology is higher, the same inputs indicate higher outputs. To ensure that the 
employees can also benefit from the development of technology, the way we adopt new technology 
need reforms.  
Employees are typically paid at fixed wage, with no incentive to renew the production process, and 
the new technology may even make them less important, at least on manufacturing operation. 
Fearing the layout, employees will resist the adoption of innovations in various way. The most 
famous case is by Masifield (1961), who observed that by-product coke ovens only applied in the 
iron and steel sector after 10 years since the innovation. More recent cases are found with similar 
patents by Stoneman (2002). Rogers (2003) identify this evidence with the introduction of 
innovations diffusion, which is the determinant of the contribution made by innovation and new 
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technologies to economic growth and welfare with different rates of adoption throughout the 
relevant population. Through the process of maximize profits and minimum the cost, the 
corporation takes employees as a major contribution to the cost. That is why we seem to have huge 
progress in innovative technology nowadays but still our economics are not in an upward slope.  
Mainly we can transform through wages. One study (Groves et al, 1994) found that if the employers 
paid more in bonuses and hired more workers on fixed-term contracts. Productivity is more 
efficient and effective. This implies that the increase in autonomy raised workers' incomes and 
investment in the enterprise. A new data set for the Safelite Glass Corporation (Lazear, 2000) 
propose one effective incentives of firms to rise output productivity by increasing wages. In Safelite, 
average productivity will rise amount to a 44% increase in output per worker. Later, Bandiera, 
Barankay and Rasul (2007) found that the flexible wages to count productivity is more efficient 
than fixed wages. So, we can conclude that wages imply some incentives on the performance of 
employees.  
Overall, when the pool of technological changes is not universal, the introduction of innovations 
might still have different impacts on the sectors. However, with the more widely application of 
artificial intelligence, the difference will shrink. Even though the policies in different states are 
various, the attractiveness of technology is the same across the geography.  
The results also imply the positive relationship between technology changes and output. The 
prediction of future is more accurate with empirical data supported. Implications for policy can be 
explained in future research. Finally, we can answer the major research question - how the society 
changes with the introduction of new technology. 
6 Conclusion  
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This paper presents evidence from a firm level experiment designed to identify the effects of 
technological shocks on the firm side. We find that the introduction of advanced technology 
raises the output that firms generate. The analysis of the production of the firms and total 
employees shows the positive correlation in firm level. The control on the sectors and location 
seems to be of little use. The technological shocks have a universal impact on our society.  
Applied the data from the account of “Machinery, Equipment and Software” implies an 
innovative way to determine technological shocks. Since it is the new investment the corporation 
introduced to the operating performance, it is more accurate than the R&D costs or patents to 
define and capture the influence of technology.  
Our findings shed some light on why firms need to hire more workers after the introduction of 
artificial intelligence. While such incentive schemes are obviously designed to increase the 
productivity, our results also suggest another subtler reason for the expansion. This stems from 
the endogenous performance interacting within the firm. This could be a cycle of technological 
investment, employees, and profit schemes.  
Understanding whether and how technological shocks affect the society is important for two 
reasons. Firstly, the progress of artificial intelligence is expanding at a rapid speed. However, we 
do not have enough empirical and theoretical model to determine its movement. This is because 
this new kind of innovations can actually replace human beings in a wider work place at a rapid 
speed, which is hard to capture. Whether this artificial intelligence will benefit our society in the 
long term deserves further research. Secondly, the interaction between artificial intelligence and 
employees highlights a possible link between economic growth and society welfare - technology 
revolution can actually drive both of the two trends upward. Such a linkage exists whenever the 
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employers can continue their business, and whenever employees can adjust themselves to satisfy 
the need of firms.   
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Figure 3：Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code in SEC website 
 
 



















Figure 8：Excel Sheet of the Analysis Sample 
 
